The eurosceptic former Thatcher cabinet member, Lord Tebbit notes in his column that it was quite clear that the euro was also a political project that would lead to a political union:
Writing in the Financial Times of January 4th, 1993 Chancellor Kohl was perfectly clear. Having described the Maastricht Treaty as ‘an interim step, albeit an important one on the road to European Union,’ he continued, ‘The parts of the treaty dealing with political union are just as important as those concerning economic and monetary union. Everyone in Europe must realise that we can preserve all our economic achievements only if we also secure them politically. An economic union will survive only if it is based on a political union.’
At the press conference following Central Bank Council Session of the Bundesbank on 20th April, 1995, the Bundesbank’s president, Dr. Hans Tietmeyer, observed that ‘a currency union is in the long term an irrevocable community of solidarity. Every experience shows that it needs a continuing commitment in the form of a comprehensive political union for its survival. By 1999 Chancellor Schroder was even clearer when he spoke at The Hague on 19th January: ‘The introduction of the euro is probably the most important integrating step since the beginning of the unification process. It is certain that the times of individual national efforts regarding employment policies, social and tax policies are definitely over.’ ‘The internal market and the common currency demand joint co-ordinating action. This will require to bury finally some erroneous ideas of national sovereignty.’
Here is Tebbit´s take on why the the euro plan was launched ins spite of the knowledge that it would probably lead to a crisis:
If it was so obvious that without enforced convergence by the establishment of political union and a single euro treasury with tax powers it would be in danger of failure, why did the creation of the euro go ahead? The answer, I fear, is that the elite of Brussels saw it as a way of enforcing economic and political union. They knew the crisis would come and they intended to use it to grab power from the member states. Instead of resisting such a plan, our political leaders here (and some elsewhere) put their fingers in their ears, closed their eyes and buried their heads in the sand. They must have, or ought to have, known that the leaders of the euro project saw it as a way of enforcing fiscal and political union, that is the creation of the European Republic. They must have, or ought to have, known that a crisis would arise for the euro which would lead either to its collapse or to the ceding to Brussels of economic and tax powers.